Abstract: Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt-contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant empirical literature has been unable to isolate each of these effects. This paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in that it allows the researcher to have access to some private information about borrower risk that is unobserved by the lender. The data also include public information about borrower risk, loan contract terms, and ex post performance for both secured and unsecured loans. The results suggest that the ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with short borrower-lender relationships that are relatively unknown to the lender.
Introduction
Collateral is a prominent feature of debt contracts. Residential and commercial mortgages, motor vehicle and equipment loans, and inter-bank repurchase agreements all rely heavily on readily marketable assets to secure funding. Interestingly, commercial loans only sometimes require collateral and the pledged assets tend to be quite heterogeneous.
The use of collateral in debt contracts can be costly for lenders, borrowers, and (in some cases) even society at large. Lenders incur costs of screening and monitoring the pledged assets, as well as any enforcement and disposal expenses in the case of repossession (e.g., Leeth and Scott 1989) . Collateral may also impose opportunity costs on borrowers by tying up assets that might otherwise be put to more productive uses.
1 As well, borrowers can suffer fluctuations in their credit availability as the values of their securable assets vary, particularly for loans secured by accounts receivable and/or inventory. In certain circumstances, collateral may also result in social costs (externalities) when changes in the value of widely pledged assets, like real estate, are correlated across borrowers and act to amplify the business cycle through procyclical changes in access to credit (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989 , Kiyatoki and Moore 1997 . Recent research suggests that the significant decline in real estate collateral values in Japan in the early 1990s played an important role in reducing debt capacity and investment in that nation (Gan 2007) . A similar procyclical effect may have occurred in the U.S. and other nations during the recent financial crisis, triggered in 2007 by the collapse in real estate collateral values.
Given that collateral is costly and yet widely employed, it is natural to inquire as to the economic functions of this contracting tool. Economic theory largely explains collateral as an attempt to either compensate for ex ante asymmetric information or as a method of reducing ex post incentive problems.
Specifically, one set of theoretical models explains collateral as arising from ex ante information gaps between borrowers and lenders that can otherwise lead to an equilibrium characterized by adverse selection 1 and credit rationing in the spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . In this case, collateral allows lenders to sort observationally equivalent loan applicants through signaling. Specifically, lenders offer a menu of contract terms such that observationally equivalent applicants with higher-quality projects choose secured debt with lower risk premiums, while those with lower-quality projects self-select into unsecured debt with higher risk premiums (e.g., Bester 1985 , 1987 , Besanko and Thakor 1987a , 1987b , Chan and Thakor 1987 , Boot, Thakor, and Udell 1991 . A second set of theoretical models motivates collateral as part of an optimal debt contract by invoking ex post frictions. These may include moral hazard concerns (e.g., Boot, Thakor, and Udell 1991 , Boot and Thakor 1994 , Aghion and Bolton 1997 , Holmstrom and Tirole 1997 ; difficulties in enforcing contracts (e.g., Banerjee and Newman 1993 , Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2004 , Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini 2004 ; and costly state verification (e.g., Townsend 1979 , Gale and Hellwig 1985 , Williamson 1986 , Boyd and Smith 1994 . Overall, the ex post theories predict that observably riskier borrowers are more likely to be required to pledge collateral.
In this paper, we test the empirical predictions generated by both the ex ante privateinformation/signaling models and the ex post models where collateral is used to overcome borrower/lender incentive conflicts. Our empirical test attempts to identify the effect of the two sets of theories by studying variation in the incidence of collateral pledges at loan origination. This test exploits differences in information that is available within a credit registry (and known to us) versus the information the registry discloses to prospective lenders. This provides us with clean measures of "private information" (information known to borrowers, but not to lenders) and "public information" (information known to both borrowers and lenders) with which to test the relevance of the two broad sets of collateral theories. By way of preview, our results are consistent with both sets of collateral theories, although the ex ante private information theories appear only to hold for borrowers that are relatively unknown to the lender (i.e., borrowers with short relationships).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a review of the related empirical literature. Section III describes the credit registry data and information sharing regime. Section IV 2 outlines our empirical test and presents the results. Additional evidence is presented in Section V and Section VI concludes.
II. Empirical Literature Review
Some of the extant empirical literature pertaining to collateral, studies how collateral incidence relates to measures of borrower risk and proxies for private information. Consistent with the ex post theories, several studies find that observably riskier borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral. One study finds positive relations between financial leverage and collateral (Brick and Palia 2007) , another finds that firms with better public ratings are less likely to pledge collateral (Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux 2004) , and four others find positive relations between collateral and past observed repayment problems (Harhoff and Korting 1998; Chakraborty and Hu 2006 , Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina 2006 , and Brick and Palia 2007 .
Studies testing theories concerning the importance of ex ante private information as a driver of collateral decisions have been much less successful. Many studies examine the effect of lender-borrower relationship strength on collateral incidence. The idea here is that stronger relationships (in terms of length, breadth, or intensity) will result in private information being revealed about the firm as lenders gather proprietary information about the borrower's character, reliability, and project choice over time (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994 , Berger and Udell 1995 , Degryse and van Cayseele 2000 . However, the effect of access to private information on collateral pledges is ambiguous since this information may be favorable or unfavorable. The ex ante theories predict that unobservably safer borrowers pledge collateral.
2
Not surprisingly, empirical tests of the role of relationship strength in determining whether collateral is pledged are mixed. Berger and Udell (1995) , Harhoff and Korting (1998) , Chakraborty and Hu (2006) , and 2 Furthermore, at least three other biases may influence the interpretation of these results. First, the more opaque the firm is, the more valuable is the private information to the lender -potentially leading to an information monopoly or "lockin" effect that would manifest itself through positive relations (e.g., Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia 1989 , Sharpe 1990 , Rajan 1992 . Second, a bias towards a positive association between collateral and relationship strength may occur if lenders use relationship lending technology for their most opaque borrowers (e.g., Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller 2010) . Finally, the results could be biased toward a negative association to the extent that collateral and relationships are substitute methods of dealing with opacity problems (e.g., Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller 2010) .
3 Brick and Palia (2007) each reports finding that stronger relationships are inversely related to the incidence of collateral for loans drawn under lines of credit. Chakraborty and Hu (2006) also find that collateral is negatively related to relationship scope defined as the total number of financial services used by the firm. By contrast, several studies report that the incidence of collateral is positively related to an indicator of "main bank" or "house bank" (Machauer and Weber 1998 , Elsas and Krahnen 2000 , Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000 , Lehmann and Neuberger 2001 , and Menkhoff, Neuberger, and Suwanaporn 2006 . Consistent with these latter studies, Ono and Uesugi (2009) find that relationship length is positively related to collateral for a sample of small Japanese firms.
More recent studies attempt to find other proxies for private information with which to test the ex ante theories of collateral. One study examines differences in informational opacity across borrowers, finding that more transparent firms are less likely to pledge collateral. Specifically, Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux (2004) find that large exchange-listed firms and those with public debt ratings are less likely to pledge collateral for bank loans. Another study exploits variation in lender information sets brought about by the use of credit scoring technology and finds that it reduces the incidence of collateral (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller 2010) . While each of these studies succeeds in better identifying variation in the information environment across borrowers or lenders, none identifies borrower-specific private information as being favorable or unfavorable, and therefore none directly tests the key empirical implication of the ex ante theories.
One recent study attempts to do this using ex post default as a measure of ex ante adverse private information, finding that this measure is negatively related to the probability of pledging collateral at origination for young firms (Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina 2006) . However, because collateral may raise the borrower's cost of default, one might expect to find that secured debt is less likely to default, irrespective of whether ex ante asymmetric information is important. Moreover, defaults may reflect moral hazard or other ex post frictions, and thus may not isolate the effects of ex ante private information.
Our methods improve upon this literature through the availability of data that allows us to empirically isolate the alternative theories of collateral: ex ante private information versus ex post contracting frictions.
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Specifically, our test exploits differences in information that is available within a credit registry (and known to us) versus the information the registry discloses to prospective lenders. This provides us with clean measures of private and public information with which to test the relevance of the two sets of collateral theories.
III. Data and Information Environment
Our analysis utilizes data from the The SBEF requires that some loan information is shared among the participating institutions to help alleviate the otherwise pervasive information asymmetries in the Bolivian credit markets. After written authorization from a prospective customer, a lender can access the registry and obtain a credit report, which contains information on all outstanding loans of the customer for the previous two months. Entries include originating bank, loan amount, type of loan, value of collateral, value of overdue payments, and the borrower's credit rating from the originating bank. Loans with overdue payments remain in the registry until they are paid off, even if they are past maturity. This implies that delinquencies in the past two months and past defaults from any previous period are observable to other lenders through the registry. By contrast, delinquencies that were paid off more than two months ago are not observable to other lenders through the registry (Campion 2001 ).
An underlying assumption that we maintain in the paper is that at least some of the information about past delinquencies does not become observable through other sources. By having access to the entire credit registry, this information-sharing regime allows us to construct our indicators of observed and unobserved borrower risk -our key independent variables for testing the two collateral theories. We construct three indicators of observed risk: a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is given to a borrower that defaulted 3 with any bank in the previous twelve months (Default_Observable_Registry), a dummy variable that equals one if the borrower had been 30+ days delinquent with any bank in the previous two months (Npl_Observable_Registry), and a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is given to a borrower that had been 30+ days delinquent with the same bank anytime from three to twelve months prior (Npl_Observable_Relationship). To measure unobserved risk, we create a dummy variable that equals one if the borrower had 30+ day delinquencies at other banks three to twelve months prior to the loan origination (Npl_Unobservable). Note that our empirical results below are materially unchanged if we expand the performance horizon back 18 or 24 months.
The data include loans from commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions (e.g., private financial funds, credit unions, mutual societies, and general deposit warehouses). To keep the set of lenders homogenous in terms of financial structure and regulation, we focus exclusively on commercial loans granted 3 "Default" occurs when the overdue payments are persistent enough for the bank to downgrade a loan to a rating of five and write-off the overdue amount. According to regulations, small loans (with an average amount smaller than US$75,000) are downgraded to five if there are overdue payments for at least 121 days for secured loans and 91 days for unsecured loans. Large loans, by contrast, are downgraded to five when the borrower is considered insolvent (i.e., when the borrower's net worth is close to zero). In the sensitivity analysis below, we investigate the robustness of our findings by re-estimating our models separately for loans with contract amounts above or below US$75,000.
6 by commercial banks between March 1999 and December 2003.
4 Table 1 provides a list of the 13 commercial banks that were active in Bolivia during the sample period, seven of which were foreign owned -four branches and three subsidiaries. 5 As shown in Table 1 , five banks dominated the Bolivian banking sector during this time -each with total assets averaging at least US$500 million and with more than 10 percent market share of deposits and loans. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for deposits is 1,292 and for loans it is 1,236, suggesting moderate market concentration.
Over the 1998 to 2003 period, the Bolivian economy slowed markedly due to the Russian/Asian financial crises, which resulted in currency depreciations for many emerging market currencies -including the Bolivian Peso. 6 Note that while Bolivian bank assets and liabilities were largely denominated in U.S. dollars, wages and business income were largely paid in domestic currency. Hence, the currency depreciation had the effect of inflating debt-to-income ratios for consumers and firms -sending some into financial distress. As a result, bank balance sheets shrunk due to deposit withdrawals and weakened loan demand, and nonperforming loans increased. 7 Despite the weakened macroeconomic and banking environment in Bolivia during our sample period, bank capital adequacy ratios remained above the 10 percent minimum requirement and actually increased over time -owing to shrinking balance sheets and government intervention in the form of low-cost loans and capital injections via subordinated debt (Sirtaine, Skamelos, and Frank 2004).
There are several types of commercial credit contracts in the data, including credit cards, overdrafts, installment loans, discount loans, and lines of credit. We focus exclusively on installment loans and discount loans and refer to these as "standard debt contracts." These contracts account for 92 percent of the total value 7 of commercial loans during the sample period. Of these contracts, 98 percent are denominated in U.S. dollars, and we use only these loans in our analysis.
Our sample encompasses 32,286 bank loans made to 2,676 different firms. A loan is defined by a unique identification code (loan id) and a date of origination. This includes new loans to new or existing customers, but also renegotiations of previous loans. Banks, however, are required to indicate whether a new loan is a renegotiation of a previous (performing or nonperforming) loan and we use this information to exclude renegotiations. 8 We also do not include as new loans drawn on pre-existing lines of credit.
9 Table 2 provides variable names, definitions, and summary statistics for all loans in the sample and for secured and unsecured loans separately. 10 Collateral was pledged for 24.4 percent of the loans in the sample. As in the U.S., secured debt in Bolivia has effective priority over unsecured debt in bankruptcy (see Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007) . 11 Of the 29,485 loans that matured before the end of the sample period, 6.4 percent had ex post delinquencies or defaults, with secured loans having a substantially higher incidence of repayment problems (9.1 percent as opposed to 5.5 percent for unsecured loans), suggesting that banks require collateral from riskier borrowers. The data also indicate that only 0.3 percent of the sample loans were given to borrowers that had defaulted in the prior twelve months (Default_Observable_Registry).
This suggests that borrowers that default rarely get another loan, either because they are credit rationed or cease to exist as a going concern. Some 5.7 percent of the loans were issued to firms that had been delinquent with any bank in the two prior months (Npl_Observable_Registry). The data also show that 7.4 percent of the credits were issued to firms that had been delinquent with the same bank anytime from three to twelve months prior (Npl_Observable_Relationship). Finally, 14.0 percent of loans were given to borrowers with delinquencies at other banks from three to twelve months prior to the loan origination (Npl_Unobservable).
As mentioned earlier, this last information item is not revealed to the lender through the credit registry but, as our empirical analysis below suggests, it might be revealed through lending relationships.
Turning to the control variables, the average banking relationship in the sample is 23.1 months. This is defined as the number of months since the first loan of this borrower from this bank in the registry since January 1998. Most of the sample firms are corporations (71.4 percent), while partnerships (14.0 percent) and sole proprietorships (12.5 percent) are much less common. Almost one-half of the sample is comprised of installment loans. The average loan amount is US$161,490 and the average loan maturity is about 12 months.
As expected, secured and unsecured loans have different contract terms. On average, secured loans are more than twice as large and have maturities that are six months longer.
IV. Empirical Analysis
Our empirical test relates the incidence of collateral to measures of observed and unobserved borrower risk, the length of the banking relationship, loan-and firm-level control variables, and bank and time fixed effects. This model, which is estimated using Probit, can be summarized as: 
where P(•) indicates probability, Collateral ijt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan is secured, and i, j, and t index loans, banks, and time, respectively. The key exogenous variables are those capturing observed and unobserved borrower risk as we defined in The vector Loan ijt accounts for differences in the individual loan contract terms. However, each of these terms could be determined simultaneously with collateral, and is potentially endogenous. We therefore estimate our empirical models both with and without these variables. Installment is a dummy variable equal to one if the contract is an installment loan rather than a discount loan. Loan_Amount is measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the amount of the loan proceeds at origination in U.S. dollars. Maturity is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months between loan origination and maturity. We explicitly exclude the loan interest rate since it is jointly determined with collateral under the ex ante theories.
Bank and time (month) fixed effects are also included in the model, represented by the scalars α j and γ t , respectively. Bank fixed effects should capture any systematic differences in bank propensities to require collateral for their commercial loans. The time fixed effects are intended to account for temporal differences in required collateral related to the business or credit cycle. Accounting for such variation may be important given the volatile macro-financial environment in Bolivia during the period under study.
Estimation results are presented in Table 3 . In Column I, we report a benchmark specification without interaction terms and loan characteristics. In Column II, we include the interaction term between the length of a bank-firm relationship and unobserved risk, and in Column III, we also add loan characteristics.
Under the heading Probit Coefficients, we report the estimated coefficients of the three Probit specifications.
Under the heading Marginal Effects, we report the change in probability of pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables, holding all other independent variables at their sample means. For continuous 11 variables, we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in the variable; and for dummy variables we report the estimated effect of a change from 0 to 1.
In all three specifications, our three indicators of observed risk are positively associated with the incidence of collateral. These findings are consistent with the ex post theories, under which observably riskier borrowers are asked to pledge collateral to mitigate frictions such as moral hazard. Each of these indicators of previous delinquencies or defaults is estimated to be associated with a 3.9 to 12.8 percentage point estimated increase in the probability of collateral being pledged. These findings are economically significant, given that the predicted probability of collateral at the mean of all independent variables (P0) is only about 20%.
The estimated coefficient of Unobserved Risk is neither statistically neither economically significant in Column I. However, when we include the interaction term between unobserved risk and relationship length, the measured effect of unobserved risk becomes both statistically and economically significant. For "new" borrowers, for whom relationship length is zero, unobserved risk is associated with 13.7 to 17.0 percentage point decrease in the probability of collateral, consistent with the ex ante theories. Combining the marginal effects of Unobserved Risk and the interaction term suggests that the effect is negative for relationships under approximately seven months. 12, 13 This is consistent with a reduction in private information with longer relationships. 14 Thus, the data suggest that the ex ante theories only hold for loans to borrowers with relatively short relationships when asymmetric information problems are more likely to be present.
Relationship length itself is significantly negatively related to the incidence of collateral. This is also consistent with the literature that banking relationships assist in resolving asymmetric information problems.
The incidence of collateral is lower for loans to partnerships or corporations than for those to sole proprietorships (the omitted category), consistent with collateral being more likely for opaque firms.
Installment loans are less likely to have collateral pledged, but larger loans and those with longer maturities are more likely to be associated with collateral pledges.
We conduct four robustness checks. First, we include a number of additional relationship characteristics to the specification reported in Column II of Table 3 . Specifically, we include a dummy variable for multiple banking relationships, a dummy variable for when the bank is the firm's primary lender (i.e., more than 50 percent of outstanding loan balances are from that bank), and a dummy variable for the existence of other lending products such as other loans, credit cards, credit lines, and overdrafts in the current account. The empirical results are materially unchanged by including additional relationship metrics.
Second, we estimate the model separately for installment and discount loans. The results are very similar to those reported in Column II of Table 3 . One difference is that the estimated coefficients of Default_Observable_Registry and Npl_Observable_Relationship in the discount loans equations are not statistically significant. However, the estimated coefficient of the third indicator of observed borrower risk, Npl_Observable_Registry, remains positive and statistically significant, supporting the ex post theories.
Third, we estimate the model separately for loans with contract amounts above and below US$75,000.
The results are very similar to those reported earlier, with the exception of the coefficient of Default_Observable_Registry that is not statistically significant in the sample of loans with a contract amount below US$75,000.
Finally, we include the loan interest rate at origination to the vector of loan characteristics included in the specification reported in Column III of Table 3 . While the interest rate is found to have negative and statistically significant relations with the incidence of collateral, including this variable had no material effect on our results.
V. Additional Evidence
We believe that studying the effects of observed and unobserved borrower risk on the incidence of collateral is the most appropriate way for empirically testing the two sets of collateral theories because it allows identification of the individual effects. There is, however, an empirical literature that relates measures 13 of borrower risk (such as the loan risk premium and ex post loan performance) to whether or not collateral was pledged for a given credit. In this case, one might be able to surmise whether the ex ante private information theories or the ex post incentive conflict models dominate empirically, but only under certain circumstances.
Most of the studies relating borrower risk to the incidence of collateral use the risk premium paid on the credit (yield less the risk free rate) as the borrower risk measure. Several studies report positive relations between risk premiums and collateral pledges (Berger and Udell 1990, Blackwell and 
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For comparative purposes, we estimate similar empirical relations using loan risk premiums and ex post loan nonperformance as risk measures. We define Risk_Premium ijt as the loan interest rate (at origination) minus the rate on the six-month U.S. Treasury bill at the end of the same month.
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Ex_Post_Nonperformance ijt is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan eventually becomes delinquent or defaults. 17 Both of these measures are regressed on a dummy variable indicating that collateral was pledged, the length of the banking relationship, the interaction of these two variables, loan-and firm-level control variables, and bank and time fixed effects as summarized below: 
15 In an earlier study, Berger and Udell (1990) use bank-level data to study the association between the quality of the loan portfolio and the proportion of loans that were collateralized. 16 The six-month U.S. Treasury rate is used because the median loan in the sample has a maturity of seven months and all loans are denominated in U.S. dollars. Estimating relations using the rate on the three-month Treasury bill had no material effect on the results. 
P(Ex_Post_Nonperformance ijt ) = h(Collateral
From a theoretical perspective, the measured effect of collateral on borrower risk in (2) and (3) is ambiguous. Under the ex post theories, collateral is required of observably riskier borrowers who are more likely to pay higher interest rates and have performance problems. But this effect could be offset -or even overturned -to the extent that collateral mitigates or eliminates the ex post frictions. The effective priority of secured debt in bankruptcy mitigates incentives for moral hazard (e.g., it reduces asset/project substitution and prevents borrowers from obtaining additional debt which jeopardizes the lender's claims) and reduces the lender's loss given default (e.g., by increasing the seniority of secured debt over unsecured debt and by facilitating the repossession of the property and thus reducing foreclosure costs). Hence, all else equal, the effective priority of secured debt should lead to smaller loan rate premiums (Smith and Warner, 1979a, 1979b) .
Under the ex ante private information theories, the measured effect of collateral is expected to be negative since it is the unobservably safer borrowers who pledge collateral more often and hence pay lower interest rates and are less likely to have performance problems. Thus, a positive measured effect of collateral on risk premiums or ex post nonperformance would suggest a net empirical dominance of the ex post theories.
By contrast, a negative measured effect would suggest either a net empirical dominance of the ex ante private information theories, an overcompensating effect of collateral under the ex post theories, or both.
As in equation (1), we also include the interaction term between collateral and relationship length,
Collateral ijt *Rel_Length ijt , because the ex ante theories are less likely to hold when the relationship is long and the bank has had time to discover more of the private information about the firm. Thus, we expect a positive sign on the interaction term in equations (2) and (3), as the ex post theories are more likely to empirically dominate when relationships are longer. All firm and loan control variables and bank and time fixed effects are the same as in equation (1).
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for equation (2) are presented in Table 4 . Column I reports a benchmark specification without the collateral-relationship length interaction term or loan characteristics.
Column II introduces the interaction term, and Column III also includes the potentially endogenous loan characteristics. In all three specifications, we find strong negative relations between loan risk premiums and the incidence of collateral. This suggests that borrowers pledging collateral generally receive a lower interest rate -consistent with either a net empirical dominance of the ex ante private information theories, an overcompensating effect of collateral under the ex post theories, or both. However, it is also the case that this negative effect is mitigated to some extent by long-term borrower-lender relationships -suggesting that as private information is revealed over time the discounts dissipate (see Columns II and III). Consistent with our previous findings, this result suggests that the ex post theories are more relevant when relationships are more established.
With respect to the control variables, we find that relationship length has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Column I when an interaction term is not included, while it is essentially zero in Columns II and III. We also find that firms organized as partnerships and corporations pay lower average loan risk premiums than sole proprietorships. This is consistent with proprietorships generally being riskier and more informationally opaque than other types of firms. Regarding contract terms, it appears that installment loans carry higher interest rates, while larger loans and loans with longer maturities carry lower interest rates. In Column I, collateral is positively associated with ex post delinquencies or defaults, consistent with net empirical dominance of the ex post theories. The estimated marginal effect suggests a 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability of ex post nonperformance for secured loans. This effect is economically significant, since the predicted probability of ex post nonperformance at the mean of all independent variables (P0) is 4.7 percent. This suggests that secured loans are almost twice as likely to have repayment problems as unsecured loans. However, when the interaction term is introduced in Column II, the results change substantially. The coefficient on collateral becomes zero implying that there is no net effect of collateral when the customer is new to the bank (i.e., when relationship length is zero). However, the positive coefficient of the interaction term implies that for longer relationships, the measured effect of collateral is positive. This is again consistent with the net empirical dominance of the ex post theories for seasoned customers.
The independent effect of relationship length is essentially zero in Column I when no interaction term is included. The negative coefficient for relationship length in Columns II and III implies that when no collateral is pledged, firms with longer relationships are less likely to have nonperformance problems, consistent with expectations that such borrowers are less risky. 18 With respect to the other control variables, we find that partnerships and corporations are more likely to have loan performance problems than sole
proprietorships. This is consistent with limited liability playing a role in default decisions. Regarding contract terms, it appears that installment loans and loans with longer maturities are associated with a higher incidence of repayment problems. Larger loans, by contrast, are negatively associated with ex post nonperformance.
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the specifications reported in Table 5 separately for loans with contract amounts above and below US$75,000. Results are similar to those reported in Table 5 . We also reestimate the specifications reported in Table 5 after dropping all loans that appear to be renegotiations of previous loans. (Recall that loans designated in the registry as renegotiations have already been excluded from this analysis.) Including such loans could bias the estimated relations between ex post nonperformance and collateral. This bias would arise in situations in which the borrower became distressed and the bank demanded that collateral is pledged, but recorded the adjustment as a new loan (see, for example, discussions in Smith 1993 and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck 2002). To identify such situations, we look for loans that are originated right after another loan at the same bank terminates. We identify 5,962 such loans, of which only 424 have collateral added. Re-estimating equation (3) without these loans has no effect on our results.
VI. Conclusions
The theoretical literature offers two broad classes of theories about why borrowers pledge collateral.
The first set of theories motivates collateral as a way for good borrowers to signal their quality under conditions of ex ante private information. The second set of theories explains collateral as an optimal response to ex post contract frictions like moral hazard. A growing body of literature that empirically tests these models and the on-going financial crisis have raised significant academic and policy interest in understanding the role of collateral in debt contracts.
This paper improves upon the empirical literature by using data from the Bolivian public credit registry that provides us with important risk information about the borrower that is not known to the lender.
Thus, we have both "private" and "public" information about the firm. Using this information structure, we are able to construct measures of both observed and unobserved risk and hence more effectively test the two sets of collateral theories. The data also allows us to explore the role of banking relationships and how information gleaned from relationships reduces private information.
We present results that suggest roles for both sets of theories, although the ex ante private information theories appear to hold only for customers with short relationships that are relatively unknown to the lender.
The data also suggest that the ex post theories tend to empirically dominate for firms with long relationships, where private information is less important.
Our analysis represents an important contribution to the literature seeking to understand the motivation for collateral in debt contracts. First, the issue has clearly been on the minds of market participants and policymakers in places like Japan and the United States owing to significant shocks to collateral values.
Second, we use credit registry data that allows us to produce clean measures of private and public information, as well as providing a rich set of controls at the loan and bank level and bank and time fixed effects to account 18 for unobserved bank heterogeneity and changes in the lending environment, respectively. Our approach might also be relevant to World Bank efforts to encourage the establishment of the development of credit registries in the developing world. Our findings suggest that the information provided by such registries might be useful in eliminating the need for costly collateral.
24 becoming "nonperforming" (at the mean of all dependent variables, P0) is around 4%, the estimated marginal effects of these four risk indicators are quite large.
Table A1 Past Performance is Predictive of Future Performance
This table reports Probit regressions for Ex Post Nonperformance, a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is 30+ days overdue anytime after its origination or if it is downgraded to the default status (i.e., given a rating of 5). Under Probit Coefficients we report the estimated coefficients of the two Probit specifications. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported between brackets. Under Marginal Effects we report the change in probability of pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables. For continuous variables we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in each independent variable and for dummy variables we report the estimated effect of a change from 0 to 1. P0 is the predicted probability of ex post nonperformance, evaluated at the mean of all independent variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Deposits Share is equal to average ratio of bank deposits to the total deposits in the banking system. Similarly, Loans Share is equal to the average ratio total bank loans to the total loans in the banking system. The Capital Ratio reports the average ratio of total capital (Tier 1+Tier 2) to total risk-weighted assets. The NPL Ratio is equal to each bank's average ratio of nonperforming loans (delinquent of at least 30 days) to total loans. Ownership indicates whether a bank is foreign-or domestically-owned and for foreign-owned whether it is a branch or subsidiary (B or S). Banks for which at least 50 percent of their equity is foreign owned are defined as Foreign. 
Table 2 Variables and Summary Statistics
The table reports the notation and definitions of variables used in the analysis, and summary statistics for all loans and for secured and unsecured loans separately.
With the exception of the summary statistics for the variable ExPost_Nonperformance, the number of observations is 32,286 for all loans, 7,864 for secured loans, and 24,422 for unsecured loans. For ExPost_Nonperformance the summary statistics use the number of loans that matured before the end of the sample period: 29,485 for all loans, 7,106 for secured loans, and 22,379 for unsecured loans. Table 3  Determinants of Collateral   This table reports Probit regressions for Collateral, a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is secured and is equal to zero otherwise. Under Probit Coefficients we report the estimated coefficients of the three Probit specifications. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported between brackets. Under Marginal Effects we report the change in probability of pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables. For continuous variables we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in each independent variable and for dummy variables we report the estimated effect of a change from 0 to 1. P0 is the predicted probability that collateral is pledged evaluated at the mean of all independent variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. This table reports Probit regressions for Ex Post Nonperformance, a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is 30+ days overdue anytime after its origination or if it is downgraded to the default status (i.e., given a rating of 5). Under Probit Coefficients we report the estimated coefficients of the three Probit specifications. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported between brackets. Under Marginal Effects we report the change in probability of pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables. For continuous variables we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in each independent variable and for dummy variables we report the estimated effect of a change from 0 to 1. P0 is the predicted probability of ex post nonperformance, evaluated at the mean of all independent variables. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Loan Characteristics
Collateral 0.362 *** -0. 
